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I. INTRODUCTION
Although snow had not yet fallen in early December of 2006, Lin-
coln children's wintertime activities had become momentarily chilled.1
The city decided that many of the municipally owned sledding areas
were too high of a liability risk to open for public use. 2 Lincoln was
also re-evaluating whether to keep open other recreational lands it
owned, such as skate parks. 3 Lincoln was not alone in this re-evalua-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Sean D. White, B.A. 2006, University of Nebraska Lincoln; J.D. expected 2009,
University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Executive Edi-
tor, 2008). I would like to thank Professor Craig M. Lawson for his review as well
as Russell Sprague for his thoughts. I would also like to thank my family and
friends for their support, especially my wife Heather, and my parents Dave and
Laura.
1. Deena Winter, New Rules for Lincoln's Sledders, LINCOLN J. STAR, Dec. 8, 2006,
at lB.
2. Id.
3. Id.; Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judici-
ary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 57-58 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Lynn Johnson,
director of Lincoln Parks and Recreation).
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tion of publicly owned recreational land. Nebraska City shut down a
skate-park.4 Omaha was in the process of cutting back its recrea-
tional facilities and re-allocating its recreational land budget to pre-
ventative measures and potential suits. 5 In fact, political subdivisions
across Nebraska were shutting down and limiting recreational
facilities. 6
Fifty years ago, the State and its political subdivisions would not
have had to worry about potential liability resulting from injuries on
government land because the doctrine of sovereign immunity would
only allow governmental entities to be sued upon their consent. 7 How-
ever, in 1969 the Nebraska Legislature passed the Political Subdivi-
sions Tort Claims Act ("PSTCA")8 and the State Tort Claims Act
("TCA")9, thereby eliminating sovereign immunity except in a few
specified categories. Injuries occurring on recreational lands were not
included in the specific exceptions to the Legislature's waiver of sover-
eign immunity; therefore, the State and its subdivisions were no
longer granted any protection from suits arising out of such injuries.
Four years before this partial waiver of sovereign immunity, the
Unicameral passed the Recreational Liability Act ("RLA"), giving im-
munity to landowners who allowed recreational use of their property
free of charge.lo In a subsequent decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court ruled that the State and its subdivisions qualified as landown-
ers under the RLA.11 Relying upon the protection of the RLA, the
State of Nebraska, its municipalities, counties, and other political sub-
divisions allowed the public to use its property for recreational pur-
4. Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 44-45 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Jo Dee Adelung,
mayor of Nebraska City and president of the League of Nebraska Municipalities).
5. Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 26 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Omaha city attorney
Paul Kratz).
6. See, e.g., Statement of Intent for LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007) (Princi-
pal Introducer: Sen. Mike Friend) (stating generally that sled runs, skate parks,
hunting and trail activities all had begun shutting down throughout the State);
Editorial, Filibuster Foes Must Stand Up for Recreation, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr.
13, 2007, at 7B (stating that cities across the State had closed recreational facili-
ties such as sledding hills, skating rings, and skate parks).
7. See generally Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly & David F. Partlett, PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 640-41 (Robert C. Clark et
al. eds., Foundation Press 11th ed. 2005) (discussing sovereign immunity
historically).
8. 1969 Neb. Laws 627-34 (codified as NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-901 to 13-926 (Reissue
1997 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
9. 1969 Neb. Laws 2845-54 (codified as NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,239 (Re-
issue 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2007)).
10. 1965 Neb. Laws 589-90 (codified as NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-729 to 37-736 (Reissue
2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
11. Watson v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
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poses, and even expended monies for the construction of certain
recreational structures.
12
In 2006, Bronsen v. Dawes County' 3 stripped away the protection
which the government had enjoyed under the RLA by overruling
twenty-five years of judicial precedent. This complete reversal of lia-
bility is what caused sledding hills, skate parks, and other recrea-
tional facilities across the State to begin shutting down. Fearing
increased liability and insurance premiums, many political subdivi-
sions closed down various publicly owned recreation sites.14 Subse-
quently, a firestorm of debate ensued which inevitably led to new
legislation re-granting the government partial immunity.
Part II of this Note focuses on the development of the judicial inter-
pretation of the government's role in the RLA, beginning with Watson
v. City of Omaha.15 Next, Part III traces the factual and procedural
background of Bronsen, overviews the case itself, and expounds the
legislative reaction. Part IV analyzes the reasoning used by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in its pivotal decision in Bronsen. Addition-
ally, this Note analyzes the legislative reaction to Bronsen, discussing
the competing interests to the legislation. Finally, Part V concludes
that the reasoning in Bronsen is justifiable, but subject to several im-
portant counterarguments. However, any attempt to overturn Bron-
sen will likely fail due to new legislative intent. Moreover, the state of
the law today is probably a good compromise for all interested parties.
II. THE RECREATIONAL LIABILITY ACT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION PRIOR TO BRONSEN
Virtually a1116 states in the United States have enacted some type
of statute granting immunity for landowners who allow the public to
12. For example, the director of the Lincoln Parks and Recreation testified that the
city had invested in numerous projects specifically in reliance upon the RLA im-
munity. One example given was two skate parks with a total investment of ap-
proximately $200,000. Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564
Before the Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 57-58 (Neb. 2007) (statement
of Lynn Johnson, director of Lincoln Parks and Recreation).
13. 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006).
14. For example, Nebraska City shut down a skate park which had been built
through fundraising efforts of area teens. The city felt that the financial risks
were too great after losing RLA immunity in Bronsen. Change the Recreational
Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st
Sess. 44-45 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Jo Dee Adelung, mayor of Nebraska City
and president of the League of Nebraska Municipalities).
15. 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
16. As of the writing of this note, in October 2007, forty-nine of the fifty states have
some type of statute similar to Nebraska's RLA. See ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-20 to 35-
15-28 (2004); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-11-
301 to 18-11-307 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 33-41-101 to 33-41-106 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to 52-557j
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
use their land for recreational purposes.17 Many of these states, Ne-
braska included, have based their statutes off of a Model Act promul-
gated by the Council of State Governments in 1965.18 Although each
state has adopted a slightly modified version, the Model Act is virtu-
ally unchanged in many instances. The general intent of the Act, reit-
erated in Nebraska's RLA, is to
encourage owners of land to make available to the public land and water areas
for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering
thereon and toward persons who may be injured or otherwise damaged by the
acts or omissions of persons entering thereon. 19
Under the RLA, an owner who does not charge the recreational users
would only be required to restrain from "willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activ-
ity . . ."20 This willful or malicious standard is even higher than
gross negligence. 2 1 Furthermore, Nebraska uses a definition of
"owner" which is commonly adopted by other states. The statutory
(West 2008); DEL. CODE tit. 7, §§ 5901-5905 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251
(West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to 51-3-26 (2005); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 520-
1 to 520-8 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1604 (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65/1 to 65/7 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-2 (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 461C.1 to 461C.7 (West 2008); KAN STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to 58-
3207 (2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:2791, 9:2795 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 159-A, 8104-A (2008);
MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-1101 to 5-1109 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN
LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301 (West
2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.03, 604A.20-604A.25 (West 2008); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to 89-2-27 (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.345 to 537.348
(West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-729 to
37-736 (Reissue 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.510 (2007);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2 to
2A:42A-10 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7 (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-1 to 38A-4 (2005);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to 53-08-06 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1533.18-1533.181 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 10.1 (West
2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.672-105.696 (2003); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 477-
1 to 477-8 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to 32-6-6 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-3-10 to 27-3-70 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-12 to 20-9-28 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-101 to 70-7-105 (2004); TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE
§§ 75.001-75.004 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-1 to 57-14-7 (2005);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5791-5795 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1809 (2003);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210 (West 2008); W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-25-1 to
19-25-5 (LexisNexis 2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.52 (West 2008); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34-19-101 to 34-19-107 (2007).
17. For a general discussion of various versions of recreational use statutes and their
effect upon common law, see John C. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The
Application of Washington's Recreational Use Statute Limiting Landowner Lia-
bility, 53 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1977).
18. 24 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Suggested State Legislation 150 (1965).
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-730 (Reissue 2004).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-734 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
21. See discussion infra section III.B.
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language states that "[o]wner includes tenant, lessee, occupant, or
person in control of the premises."2 2 However, both the RLA and the
Model Act fail to specify whether the State and its political subdivi-
sions qualify as owners.
The Nebraska Supreme Court first addressed whether the RLA in-
cluded the State and its subdivisions as "owners" in Watson v. City of
Omaha.2 3 In Watson, a child fell from a slide in an Omaha city
park. 24 The Court concluded that the city was an owner under the
RLA and should therefore be held to the willful or malicious stan-
dard.2 5 The Court reasoned2 6 that the city had derivative immunity
through a clause in the PSTCA which states:
Except as otherwise provided in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, in
all suits brought under the act the political subdivision shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances .... 27
Because the PSTCA does not address what liability a city would have
toward recreational users of its land, the court concluded that "the
[city] is entitled to assert the defenses that a private property owner
has in like circumstances." 28 Therefore, because the Legislature was
presumed to have knowledge of the 1965 RLA when they adopted the
1969 PSTCA, the Court concluded that the Legislature intended to
include the State and its subdivisions in the RLA via section 13-908 of
the PSTCA.29 Thus, "the definition of owner ... is sufficiently broad
to cover a public entity."30
The Watson rule was explicitly upheld by the Nebraska Supreme
Court on three occasions. In Bailey v. City of North Platte, a man was
injured when he stepped in a hole while playing softball at a North
Platte city field.31 In a brief opinion, the Court declined, without rea-
soning, to overrule Watson.3 2 In 1987, the Court upheld the Watson
rule in two separate cases. In one case a boy was injured sledding on
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-729 (Reissue 2004).
23. 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
24. Id. at 836, 312 N.W.2d at 256.
25. Id. at 842, 312 N.W.2d at 259.
26. Id. at 840-41, 312 N.W.2d at 259.
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-908 (Reissue 2004).
28. Watson, 209 Neb. at 841, 312 N.W.2d at 259 (quoting Primo v. Bridgeton, 162
N.J. Super. 394, 400, 392 A.2d 1252, 1256 (1978)).
29. Id. at 841, 312 N.W.2d at 259.
30. Id. at 841, 312 N.W.2d at 259.
31. 218 Neb. 810, 811, 359 N.W.2d 766, 767 (1984).
32. Id. at 811, 359 N.W.2d at 767.
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land owned by the Omaha Public Power District,3 3 and in another
case a woman was injured on a slide in an Omaha city park.3 4
However, the Watson rule became suspect after the 2005 decision
Iodence v. City of Alliance.3 5 In Iodence, a woman was injured while
driving to her son's football game when her car hit a tree stump at a
softball complex owned by the city of Alliance. 36 The Court ruled that
"spectating" at a youth football game did not qualify as a recreational
purpose under the RLA and thus the city was liable.37 More impor-
tantly, in a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Hendry questioned the
application of the RLA to public lands under the Watson rule, and ex-
pounded several points of reasoning to support this position. 38 How-
ever, Chief Justice Hendry's discussion in Iodence was dictum and did
not overrule Watson.3 9 Therefore, by 2006, twenty-five years of prece-
dent granting the State and its subdivisions the status of "owner", and
thus immunity under the RLA, had been brought into question.
III. BRONSEN AND LEGISLATIVE BILL 564
A. The Case
In July 2002, Carolyn Bronsen decided to attend Fur Trade Days
in Chadron, Nebraska with her family.40 Part of the festivities oc-
curred on the lawn of the Dawes County courthouse, and picnic tables
had been set out for people to relax while eating food served at the
celebration.41 Bronsen, who had not previously visited the courthouse
lawn, walked with her family to a table to eat lunch. 4 2 At some point
Bronsen was able to feel that the lawn was uneven, and she was
aware that her father had previously stepped in a hole in the lawn.4 3
After eating, Bronsen picked up her trash and began walking to a
trash can in order to throw it away, but stepped in either a hole or
some type of uneven ground and broke her ankle.44
33. Gallagher v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 225 Neb. 354, 405 N.W.2d 571 (1987)
(stating that precedent clearly included public owners in the RLA).
34. Thies v. City of Omaha, 225 Neb. 817, 408 N.W.2d 306 (1987) (citing prior cases
and stating that the case clearly fell in line with such precedent).
35. 270 Neb. 59, 700 N.W.2d 562 (2005).
36. Id. at 60, 700 N.W.2d at 563.
37. Id. at 62-64, 700 N.W.2d at 564-65.
38. Id. at 64-72, 700 N.W.2d at 565-71 (Hendry, C.J., concurring) (using the reason-
ing which would be adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Bronsen).
39. See, e.g., Bronsen v. Dawes County, 14 Neb. App. 82, 94, 704 N.W.2d 273, 283 (Ct.
App. 2005) (stating that the court was still bound by the Watson rule), rev'd, 272
Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006).
40. Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 322, 722 N.W.2d 17, 20 (2006).
41. Id. at 322, 722 N.W.2d at 21.
42. Id. at 322, 722 N.W.2d at 21.
43. Id. at 322, 722 N.W.2d at 21.
44. Id. at 323, 722 N.W.2d at 21.
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Bronsen filed a lawsuit against Dawes County and Fur Trade
Days, Inc. ("FTD"), alleging various theories of negligence.45 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for both defendants, conclud-
ing that the defendants were "owners" under the RLA and thus
immune because their actions did not amount to willful or malicious
failure to prevent the injury.46 The Nebraska Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision, noting that the Watson rule was still the prevail-
ing law, granting public land immunity under the RLA.47 Therefore,
Bronsen decided to directly challenge the Watson rule in the Nebraska
Supreme Court.
In support of her position, Bronsen had a line of dissents stretching
back to the Watson ruling in addition to Chief Justice Hendry's con-
curring opinion in Iodence.48 The Nebraska Supreme Court found the
reasoning expounded in these dissents and the Iodence concurrence
convincing and overruled Watson.4 9 Specifically, the Court utilized
six points of reasoning drawn from the prior dissents and the Iodence
concurrence in reaching its conclusion. First, the Court reasoned that
"[a] governmental entity's primary purpose in owning [recreational or
park property] is to make it available for public use."50 Therefore, the
governmental entity "needs no incentive to perform this traditional
function."5 1
Next, the Court believed that including political subdivisions in the
RLA would render a nonsensical reading of the statute. Specifically,
the Court noted that section 37-733 relieves an owner of land from
liability, if such owner leases the land to the State for recreational
purposes.52 Even if the State, as a lessee, charges for the public to use
the land, the owner incurs no liability. However, if the State as an
owner (assuming the State is an "owner" for RLA purposes) simply
charges the public to use the land, then it would lose the protection of
the RLA and be liable under an ordinary negligence standard.53 The
Court reasoned that
45. Id. at 322, 722 N.W.2d at 21.
46. Id. at 324, 722 N.W.2d at 22. The court also held that Bronsen's activities quali-
fied as "picnicking" which was a recreational activity triggering the RLA. Id. at
324, 722 N.W.2d at 22.
47. Bronsen v. Dawes County, 14 Neb. App. 82, 704 N.W.2d 273 (Ct. App. 2005),
rev'd, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006).
48. See Gallagher v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 225 Neb. 354, 405 N.W.2d 571 (1987);
Thies v. City of Omaha, 225 Neb. 817, 408 N.W.2d 306 (1987); Garreans v. City of
Omaha, 216 Neb. 487, 345 N.W.2d 309 (1984) (only addressing the Watson rule
in the dissent); Bailey v. City of North Platte, 218 Neb. 810, 359 N.W.2d 766
(1984); Watson v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
49. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 328, 722 N.W.2d at 24.
50. Id. at 328, 722 N.W.2d at 24.
51. Id. at 328, 722 N.W.2d at 24.
52. Id. at 329, 722 N.W.2d at 24-25.
53. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-731 (Reissue 2004).
2008]
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if "owner of land" under § 37-729(2) includes governmental entities, then § 37-
733 must be read to authorize a governmental entity to lease land to itself
and, by doing so, avoid liability for ordinary negligence.
5 4
The Court believed that this was a nonsensical reading of the statute
and therefore the Legislature must not have intended governmental
entities to qualify as "owners" under the RLA.55
Third, the Court did not believe the RLA was meant to include gov-
ernmental entities as owners because at the time of its enactment in
1965 such entities were still protected by sovereign immunity.56 The
TCA and PSTCA waiving such immunity were not passed until
1969.57 If the entities already had immunity, then granting them im-
munity under the RLA would have been redundant. Due to this re-
dundancy, the Court did not believe that the Legislature could have
intended the State and its subdivisions to be included as "owners"
under the RLA.
Additionally, the Court struggled to justify the divergent outcomes
possible under the RLA for parties injured on public land. If a govern-
mental entity were an owner under the RLA, then a person injured
using the land for recreational purposes would have no recourse un-
less the injured party could show willful or malicious failure to pre-
vent the injury on the part of the government. 58 However, an
individual using the same land for any non-recreational purpose,
which is not granted special treatment by the TCA and PSTCA, would
be able to sue the entity upon a showing of ordinary negligence. 5 9 The
Court noted several hypothetical examples, such as a man bicycling to
work rather than bicycling for enjoyment, where two people doing es-
sentially the same act would receive different liability treatment.60
The Court concluded that it was unreasonable to allow "a claimant's
fortuitous purpose in using public property to become an outcome-de-
terminative factor in deciding whether to apply the liability standard
of the PSTCA or the RLA."61
Furthermore, the Court believed that the concept of derivative im-
munity was in direct conflict with Nebraska's PSTCA. The PSTCA
and TCA grant governmental entities the same immunities afforded
private individuals unless specifically provided by the PSTCA and
TCA respectively. 62 The Court believed that the PSTCA and the TCA,
54. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 329, 722 N.W.2d at 25.
55. Id. at 329, 722 N.W.2d at 25.
56. Id. at 329-30, 722 N.W.2d at 25.
57. See 1969 Neb. Laws 628-34 & 2845-54.
58. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-734 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
59. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 331-32, 722 N.W.2d at 25-26.
60. Id. at 331-32, 722 N.W.2d at 25-26.
61. Id. at 331, 722 N.W.2d at 26.
62. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2,215 (Reissue 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-908 (Reissue
1997).
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in fact, contained such a provision. Section 13-910 of the PSTCA and
section 81-8,219(7) provide that the waiver of immunity does not apply
to
any claim based upon the failure to make an inspection or making an inade-
quate or negligent inspection of any property other than property owned by or
leased to such political subdivision to determine whether the property com-
plies with or violates any statute, ordinance, rule, or regulation or contains a
hazard to public health or safety unless the political subdivision had reasona-
ble notice of such hazard or the failure to inspect or inadequate or negligent
inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for public health or safety.
6 3
The Court believed that if the Legislature had wanted a governmental
entity to enjoy immunity for failing to inspect property it owned or
leased, then it could easily have included such a provision in the re-
spective tort claim acts.64 "By excluding public property in this fash-
ion and reading the statute as a whole, the Legislature has shown an
intent to be liable for ordinary negligence with respect to publicly
owned or leased property."65
Finally, the Court looked to the Model Act on which Nebraska's
RLA was based and decided that because that Act was likely meant to
include only private lands, the RLA should only include private
lands.66 The Court noted that the Model Act contained an introduc-
tory commentary which stated that the Act was intended "to en-
courage availability of private lands .... ,,67 Nebraska adopted the Act
"almost verbatim;" therefore, the purpose in this introductory com-
mentary should apply to the RLA.68 The Court concluded that "[t]his
purpose precludes applying the RLA's immunity to governmental enti-
ties through [the PSTCA] ."69
In response to these points, 70 Dawes County and FTD argued for
the Court to recognize legislative acquiescence on the matter and give
great weight to stare decisis.71 FTD argued that the Legislature had
shown acquiescence by not taking action to alter the Watson rule.72
63. NEB. REV. STAT § 13-910(3) (Cum. Supp. 2007) (emphasis added); see also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,219(7) (Cum. Supp. 2007) (emphasis added) (utilizing the same
language, except addressing the State rather than political subdivisions).
64. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 333-34, 722 N.W.2d at 27-28.
65. Id. at 333-34, 722 N.W.2d at 28.
66. Id. at 334, 722 N.W.2d at 28.
67. Id. at 334, 722 N.W.2d at 28 (quoting 24 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Sug-
gested State Legislation 150 (1965)).
68. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 334, 722 N.W.2d at 28.
69. Id. at 334, 722 N.W.2d at 28.
70. Both Fur Trade Days, Inc. and Dawes County made several other arguments in
their briefs relating directly to the court's six points of reasoning. However the
court did not directly address these contentions in the case. Section IV.A of this
note will address these arguments in the in-depth analysis of the Court's
reasoning.
71. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 28-29.
72. Id. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 28-29.
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However, the Court was not bound by such acquiescence because "[i]f
[legislative acquiescence] were applied as a rule in every case involv-
ing statutory construction, no judicial construction of a statute could
be overruled in the absence of legislative action." 73 Furthermore, FTD
argued that stare decisis should be given great weight in this case,
especially because governmental entities had relied upon the Watson
rule when expending funds on recreational areas. 74 Again, the Court
was not persuaded, and justified overruling Watson because that rule
was "manifestly wrong."7 5 Therefore, after twenty-five years, Watson
was overruled and governmental entities no longer fell under the pro-
tection of the RLA.
B. Legislative Reaction to Bronsen
With its ruling in Bronsen the Nebraska Supreme Court triggered
outcries and preventative reactions throughout Nebraska, especially
among municipalities. 76 In reliance upon the Watson rule, the State
and its subdivisions had "opened thousands of acres of public land for
hunting, fishing, swimming, hiking, biking, and numerous other types
of recreational and leisure activities . . . ."77 In response to the poten-
tial increase in liability and insurance costs after Bronsen, many gov-
ernmental entities began closing down various recreational
facilities. 78 These concerns led to several potential bills being intro-
73. Id. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 28-29.
74. Id.; Brief on Hearing for Further Review for Fur Trade Days, Inc. as Respondant-
Appellee at 6-7, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006)
(No. S-04-000237).
75. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 29.
76. For example, one newspaper article stated that Lincoln city officials believed the
court had "thrown open the door to lawsuits," and quoted Lynn Rex, the executive
director of the League of Nebraska Municipalities as saying that "[t]his is one of
those court cases that, whether the Nebraska Supreme Court recognizes it or not,
will have profound impact on whether or not municipalities will continue to offer
recreational activities at all." Editorial, Find a Way to Protect City Rec Sites,
LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 19, 2006, at 7B.
77. Statement of Intent for LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007) (Principal Intro-
ducer: Sen. Mike Friend).
78. See, e.g., Statement of Intent for LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007) (Princi-
pal Introducer: Sen. Mike Friend) (stating generally that sled runs, skate parks,
hunting and trail activities had begun shutting down throughout the State);
Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 26 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Omaha city attorney
Paul Kratz) (stating that because of increased insurance costs and potential liti-
gation costs deriving from the Bronsen decision, the city would be forced to begin
analyzing cost re-allocation which would likely include shifting money from rec-
reational activities to risk prevention); Change the Recreational Liability Act:
Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 42 (Neb.
2007) (statement of Wes Sheets, representative of the Izaak Walton League) (dis-
cussing the closing of University of Nebraska property at Mead Research Center
which was used by the public for hunting, as one example of areas shutting down
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duced in the Nebraska Legislature which would essentially change
the RLA to reflect the legal landscape before Bronsen.79 One such bill,
Legislative Bill 564, advanced from the Judiciary Committee on Feb-
ruary 14, 2007, and after extensive debate was adopted by the Legisla-
ture in May 2007.80
However, the adopted version of Legislative Bill 564 is substan-
tively different than what was originally introduced. Originally, Leg-
islative Bill 564 was meant only to clarify that "owner" under the RLA
included the State and its political subdivisions. 8 1 Amendments by
the Judiciary Committee significantly altered Legislative Bill 564 and
gave the bill a more limited scope than a simple change in the mean-
ing of "owner" under the RLA.
Instead of amending the RLA, the version of Legislative Bill 564
which came out of the Judiciary Committee amended the PSTCA and
the TCA.82 Rather than explicitly granting the State and its political
subdivisions "owner" status under the RLA, the new Legislative Bill
564 created another exception to the general waiver of immunity in
the PSTCA and the TCA.83 The bill explicitly states that the amended
portion of the PSTCA and TCA, rather than the sections dealing with
negligent inspections of non-public property by governmental entities,
will control in situations involving recreational lands owned or leased
by the State and its political subdivisions.
8 4
The main thrust of Legislative Bill 564 was to exclude three dis-
tinct situations from the general waiver of sovereign immunity under
the TCA and PSTCA. The first situation in which governmental enti-
due to Bronsen); Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before
the Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 44-45 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Jo
Dee Adelung, president of the League of Municipalities and mayor of Nebraska
City) (testifying that Nebraska City was forced to shut down a skateboard park
because of the increased potential costs and liabilities after Bronsen).
79. LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007), LB 566, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2007), and LB 567, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007) all were introduced regard-
ing this change.
80. Revised Comm. Statement for LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007) (Judici-
ary Committee); Legislative Journal, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 1540, 1626 (Neb.
2007).
81. See Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judici-
ary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 22 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Sen. Mike Friend).
82. LB 564 §§ 2-5, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007).
83. Id.
84. Id. §§ 2, 4. Presumably, this is a reaction to Bronsen's reliance upon such prior
sections of the PSTCA and TCA in concluding that the Legislature did not intend
to immunize governmental entities from liability occurring on public lands. See
generally supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing Bronsen's reli-
ance upon the relevant sections of the PSTCA and TCA). Although there is no
reference to this particular subsection in the legislative history of Legislative Bill
564, it seems more than probable that Bronsen's reasoning helped shape Legisla-
tive Bill 564.
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ties now enjoy immunity is when a claim arises "relating to recrea-
tional activities for which no fee is charged . . .resulting from the
inherent risk of the recreational activity."8 5 The bill further defines
inherent risk of recreational activities as "those risks that are charac-
teristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of the activity."8 6
Several examples of injuries which would result from inherent
risks of recreational activities are specifically discussed in the legisla-
tive history of Legislative Bill 564. For instance, if an individual play-
ing baseball on land owned by the State is struck by the ball and
injured, such injury would be inherent to baseball and thus the State
would not be liable. But if the person is "running through the outfield
and . . .fall[s] into a hole up to [his] knee, that's not an inherent
risk .... [that is a condition of the land, and ... would be governed by
a different provision in this bill."87 Furthermore, while a knee injury
or spinal cord injury resulting from tackling someone in a football
game is an inherent risk, having the fence which surrounds the field
fall on an individual is not.8 8 However, the most salient inherent
risks discussed during Legislative Bill 564's adoption include the bro-
ken bones, spinal injuries, and other injuries common to participants
in skate parks.8 9
The second situation where Legislative Bill 564 grants the State
and its political subdivisions immunity is when an injury results from
some defect on the premises. Immunity exists if the injury results
from a recreational activity for which no fee is charged and arises
out of a spot or localized defect of the premises unless the spot or localized
defect is not corrected by the political subdivision leasing, owning, or in con-
trol of the premises within a reasonable time after actual or constructive no-
tice of the spot or localized defect. 9 0
Furthermore, the State or political subdivision "shall be charged with
constructive notice only when the failure to discover the spot or local-
ized defect of the premises is the result of gross negligence." 9 1 Gross
negligence is defined as "the absence of even slight care in the per-
formance of a duty involving an unreasonable risk of harm."9 2
Therefore, if the State or political subdivision fails to use even
slight care in its inspections of the land, it will be liable for injuries
resulting from defects that an adequate inspection would have discov-
85. LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007).
86. Id.
87. Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 26 (Neb. 2007) (state-
ment of Sen. Lathrop).
88. Id. at 22-23.
89. See, e.g., Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 6-30 (Neb.
2007).
90. LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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ered. This standard produces a different result than if Legislative Bill
564 would have amended the RLA. Under the RLA, the landowner
only loses immunity in this situation for willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against the dangerous defect.93 The willful or mali-
cious failure standard is higher than gross negligence because it re-
quires conscious knowledge of the danger coupled with either
intentional or reckless failure to prevent the harm.9 4 As a result,
under the current state of the law, an injured plaintiff bringing an
action against a governmental entity-landowner will have a lower
standard to prove to overcome immunity protections.
Finally, the third situation where immunity is granted under Leg-
islative Bill 564 is when the design of a skate park or bicycle
motocross park is the cause of the injury. However, to qualify for the
immunity, the skate or bicycle motocross park must be "constructed
for purposes of skateboarding, inline skating, bicycling, or scooter-
ing."9 5 Additionally, the park must be "constructed or reconstructed,
reasonably and in good faith, in accordance with generally recognized
engineering or safety standards or design theories in existence at the
time of the construction or reconstruction."96 With the adoption of
Legislative Bill 564, these three categories encompass the entire scope
of protections the State and its political subdivisions enjoy with regard
to users of recreational land.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's reasoning for overruling Watson in Bronsen can be dis-
puted in several different ways. However, the recently adopted legis-
lation has addressed the issues in Bronsen in such a way as to likely
exclude any overruling of the case. Despite the fact that Bronsen
would likely survive a challenge, the new legislation is a good compro-
mise for all interested parties and the state of the law is well justified
and supports good public policy.
A. The Court's Reasoning in Bronsen
In ruling that Watson was no longer the law, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court relied upon six main points of reason. 97 The Court used
these six points in an attempt to interpret the intent of a forty-year-
old piece of legislation which had only a small amount of legislative
93. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-734 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
94. See, e.g., Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 326-27, 722 N.W.2d 17, 23
(2006).
95. LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007).
96. Id.
97. See discussion supra section III.A.
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history.98 Further complicating the Court's job, the legislative history
which existed granted very little access into the minds of the adopting
legislators. 99 Although the Court gave compelling and justifiable ar-
guments for its six points of reason, for each point an equally, if not
more compelling argument can be made counter to the Court's ruling.
In most instances the Court failed to adequately address these argu-
ments, and only gave nominal treatment to other additional argu-
ments. Therefore, the Court's reasoning should not be adopted or
viewed as the strong, sole reasoning it is portrayed to be. It appears
that the Court made a much closer call than its opinion depicts.
The first line of reasoningOO Bronsen promulgated was that the
State and its political subdivisions need no motivation to open, or keep
open, lands to the public for recreational purposes because such enti-
ties either have duties to create recreational facilities or it is part of
their traditional function.101 The stated policy for the RLA is to "en-
courage owners of land to make available to the public land and water
areas for recreational purposes by limiting their liability . ... 102
Therefore, Bronsen reasoned that the RLA was never intended to in-
clude the State and its political subdivisions.103
Although it is true that some governmental entities generally have
a duty to make land available to the public,10 4 and some subdivisions
will still maintain recreational facilities because it is their traditional
function, the Court in Bronsen assumed too much in concluding that
the government needs no motivation. As FTD pointed out in its brief,
numerous governmental or quasi-governmental subdivisions likely do
98. The record includes: a one-half page statement of intent, Statement of Intent for
LB 280, Leg., 75th Sess. (Neb. 1965) (Principal Introducer: Sen. Kremer); thirty-
three lines in the transcript of the committee report, Minutes of Agriculture and
Recreation Comm.: Hearing on LB 280, Leg., 75th Sess. 1-3 (Neb. 1965); a one-
half page committee statement, Comm. Statement on LB 280: Agriculture and
Recreation Comm., Leg., 75th Sess. (Neb. 1965); and twenty-eight lines in the
transcript of the floor debate, Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 280, Leg., 75th
Sess. 1158-59 (Neb. 1965).
99. See supra note 98. The small amount of legislative history which exists only gen-
erally discusses what the bill does. There is no real indication whether the legis-
lators intended the State and its subdivisions to be included.
100. Because this Note has discussed the Court's reasoning in section III.A, Part IV
will only expound such reasoning to the extent necessary to understand the
counterarguments.
101. 272 Neb. 320, 328, 722 N.W.2d 17, 24 (2006).
102. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-730 (Reissue 2004).
103. 272 Neb. at 328-29, 722 N.W.2d at 24.
104. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-3229 (Reissue 1997) (stating that one of the pur-
poses of natural resources districts was the development and management of rec-
reational and park facilities).
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need motivation to open, and keep open, recreational lands.10 5 For
instance, the Central Nebraska Public Power District and the Ne-
braska Public Power District own large tracts of land with lakes and
other waterways which are attractive for hunting and fishing.106
These entities have often allowed recreational activities on this land
despite not having a duty to do so. 10 7 However, such entities appear
to allow recreational use of the land in large part because they are
protected by RLA immunity. 0 8 Numerous other entities-including
natural resource districts which have a general duty to develop recrea-
tional facilities-appeared poised to limit or eliminate recreational
lands they had held open in reliance upon the RLA.109 If these enti-
ties did not have protection from liability, it is much more likely that
105. Brief on Hearing for Further Review for Fur Trade Days, Inc. as Respondant-
Appellee at 7-8, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006)
(No. S-04-000237).
106. Id.; see also Nebraska Public Power District, Irrigation and Recreation, http:/!
www.nppd.com/AboutUs/Energy-Facilities/facilities/irrigation.asp (discussing
several of the different tracts of land the NPPD opens to the public for recrea-
tional purposes) (last visited June 23, 2008).
107. Id. There is no general statutory duty mandating public power districts (or most
other subdivisions such as municipalities) to open or maintain recreational areas.
Individual cities or other subdivisions such as public power districts may have
specific requirements in local ordinances, operating/cooperative agreements, pro-
visions in transferring instruments, or other relevant particularized authority
depending on their individual respective positions. However, there is no over-
arching or consistently present duty. NEB. REV. STAT. section 13-304 (Reissue
1997) grants political subdivisions the power to implement and maintain recrea-
tional facilities, but does not require such activity. Furthermore, even where mu-
nicipal codes or cooperative agreements required an effort to open recreational
facilities, the RLA immunity gave such entities the freedom to expand the scope
of facilities offered because of a reduced fear of liability.
108. See Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judici-
ary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 74 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Chris Dibbern,
representative of the Nebraska Power Association which represents numerous
public power districts) (testifying that Bronsen may limit the ability of public
power districts to keep open lands for recreational use).
109. See, e.g., Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the
Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 62 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Glenn John-
son, general manager of the Lower Platte South Natural Resources District) (tes-
tifying that that district would be ending public recreational use of many of its
tracts of land ordinarily used for hiking, hunting, fishing, bicycling, picnicking,
camping, and horseback riding due to Bronsen); Change the Recreational Liabil-
ity Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess.
75-76 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Joel Pedersen, University of Nebraska represen-
tative) (discussing the potential restricting impact of Bronsen upon land owned
by the University which is open for recreational purposes); Change the Recrea-
tional Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg.,
1st Sess. 67-69 (Neb. 2007) (statement of John Bonaiuto, executive director of
Nebraska Association of School Boards) (discussing the negative ramifications of
Bronsen upon playgrounds and other land owned by school districts which is used
during non-school hours).
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they would restrict the public from using such land for recreational
purposes. 110
In fact, the response to Bronsen by many political subdivisions
across the State in shutting down or limiting their recreational areas
should be proof enough that such entities need some type of motiva-
tion. One example involves a skate park in Nebraska City. Respond-
ing to a city ordinance which banned skateboarding in the downtown
area of Nebraska City, local youths raised $150,000 to build a profes-
sionally designed skate park in the city park.",1 After Bronsen, the
city decided to lock up the skate park because of the potential for in-
creased liability and higher insurance premiums.112 Thus, even
though the city still provides a park for its citizens, any activities in-
volving the skate park are no longer available. Similarly, Omaha
closed some sledding hills and began discussing the closing of BMX
parks1 13 and skateboarding parks.114 Numerous other communities
either closed down or deferred construction of recreational facilities
after Bronsen.115
The response to Bronsen clearly shows that the State and its politi-
cal subdivisions often do need motivation to construct recreational fa-
cilities and open land to the public for recreational purposes. Having
no liability protection will, at a minimum, constrain the scope of recre-
ational facilities made available to the public, often to the detriment of
potential users. Therefore, the idea that the Legislature intended the
RLA to include governmental entities to help motivate them to open
up and keep open recreational land and facilities is logical and Bron-
110. See supra note 109.
111. Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 44 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Jo Dee Adelung, mayor
of Nebraska City).
112. Id. at 44-45.
113. BMX parks are parks designed for a specific type of bicycle known as a BMX
bicycle. According to Merriam-Webster On-line, BMX stands for "bicycle
motocross." Furthermore, Merriam-Webster On-line states that such bicycles are
differentiated from other bicycles because they are used in "racing that resembles
motocross with dirt tracks and jumps," which needs such "special heavy-duty bi-
cycles." Merriam-Webster On-line, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/BMX (last vis-
ited June 23, 2008).
114. Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 34 (Neb. 2007) (statements of Omaha City Attorney
Paul Kratz and Sen. Lathrop).
115. See, e.g., Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the
Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 58 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Lynn John-
son, parks and recreation director for Lincoln) (testifying that at least eleven
other municipal members of the Nebraska Recreation and Parks Association had
closed or deferred construction of recreational facilities).
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sen's contrary conclusion on this point should be severely weakened, if
not dismissed.116
The Court in Bronsen also believed that including governmental
entities in the RLA led to a nonsensical reading of the statute because
such entities could circumvent liability via section 37-733 while charg-
ing for use of the land.1l 7 It is true that, in theory, the State or its
political subdivisions could avoid ordinary negligence by leasing the
land to itself. However, it could be argued that the legislature in-
tended to allow political subdivisions to lease to the State and other
political subdivisions and gain the same immunity as private land-
owners leasing to the State. For instance, public power districts often
hand over management of their lands to the Nebraska Game and
Parks Commission.118 Allowing such a political subdivision to avoid
liability when it leases land to another political subdivision is not nec-
essarily nonsensical. This arrangement seems fair. If the lessee sub-
division maintains control over the premises, why should the owner
subdivision be liable? Therefore, allowing political subdivisions to
gain immunity when they lease their property to other political subdi-
visions should not negate the purpose of the RLA. These political sub-
divisions can fit within the statute without resulting in a
"nonsensical" reading. The one issue with this argument is that such
a construction could allow public landowners to manipulate the rules
by leasing to themselves. However, as the FTD brief emphasized,
there have been no reported cases of such activity in Nebraska. 1 19
Furthermore, such a deceptive transaction to avoid liability would
easily be ascertained by courts and justifiably ignored. 1 2o
116. Other courts have equally dismissed this reasoning. See, e.g., Olson v. Bismarck
Parks & Recreation Dist., 642 N.W.2d 864, 870 (N.D. 2002) (stating that "'the
principle of encouraging landowners to open their land by limiting potential tort
liability applies with equal force to the Government as to other landowners'...
[because the Government maintains] the power to close or severely limit the use
of its land to the public" (internal citation omitted)).
117. 272 Neb. 320, 329, 722 N.W.2d 17, 24-25 (2006). For further explanation of the
Court's reasoning on this point, see discussion supra section III.A.
118. See, e.g., Nebraska Public Power District, Irrigation and Recreation, http://
www.nppd.com/AboutUs/Energy-Facilities/facilities/irrigation.asp (last visited
June 23, 2008).
119. Brief on Hearing for Further Review for Fur Trade Days, Inc. as Respondant-
Appellee at 9-10, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006)
(No. S-04-000237).
120. Id. Such a result may be compared with Veskerna v. City of West Point, 254 Neb.
540, 578 N.W.2d 25 (1998), overruled by Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320,
722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), where the Court decided that the intent of the RLA did not
include allowing a city to avoid liability when continuously open non-recreational
land temporarily hosted a recreational activity. This would be similar because
the Court could decide that the intent of the RLA did not include allowing politi-
cal subdivisions to lease to themselves rather than to other public entities. Such
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Next, the Court in Bronsen argued that because the State and its
political subdivisions enjoyed sovereign immunity when the RLA was
passed, the legislature could not have contemplated granting such en-
tities immunity because it would have been redundant.12 1 However,
the Court failed to adequately address a compelling counterargument,
which was, in fact, the basic reasoning in Watson.122 Even if the 1965
Legislature did not (because of sovereign immunity) explicitly intend
to include governmental entities, nothing the Legislature did affirma-
tively indicates that such entities should not be included through de-
rivative immunity in the TCA and PSTCA.
The TCA and PSTCA maintain certain enumerated areas of immu-
nity, but waive sovereign immunity for all other areas. Consequently,
the State and its political subdivisions have the same liabilities and
immunities as a private individual under the circumstances. 123 Dur-
ing the adoption of the TCA and PSTCA, the Legislature did not enu-
merate any exceptions for recreational use of public land. 1 24 Due to
this lack of action, it can be assumed that the Legislature intended the
State and its subdivisions to be liable, and immune, to the same ex-
tent as private individuals. Thus, even under the assumption that the
RLA was not (because of sovereign immunity) originally intended for
governmental entities, the derivative provisions of the TCA and
PSTCA should grant such entities RLA status.
In fact, several other states judicially construe recreational use
statutes to apply to governmental entities through a derivative provi-
sion in their tort claim acts. 12 5 Furthermore, courts have explicitly
rejected the argument which Bronsen made on this point of reasoning.
One South Carolina court responded to the redundant immunity argu-
ment by stating that "[s]tatutes must be updated functionally to re-
flect changes in . . . the legal landscape .... [the court must give]
effect to legislative intent in light of the purposes the statute was
meant to achieve."12 6 That court went on to reason that the redun-
dant immunity argument was not persuasive because nothing in the
a ruling would not be unprecedented in its basic reasoning, and would allow
courts to avoid the harsh result of completely terminating the Watson rule.
121. 272 Neb. at 329-30, 722 N.W.2d at 25.
122. See Watson v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-908 (Reissue 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,215 (Reissue
1999).
124. 1969 Neb. Laws 628-34 & 2845-54.
125. See, e.g., Trimblett v. State, 383 A.2d 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Pip-
pin v. M.A. Hauser Enterprises, Inc., 676 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996);
Hughey v. Grand River Dam Auth., 897 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 1995); Lory v. City of
Philadelphia, 674 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996); see generally Debra Wolfe Goldstein, The
Recreation Use of Land and Water Act: Lory v. City of Philidelphia, 35 DuQ. L.
REV. 783 (1997) (discussing this interpretation by the court in Lory).
126. Brooks v. Northwood Little League, Inc., 489 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to 27-3-70 (2007) (this recreational use
[Vol. 87:569
RECREATIONAL USES OF PUBLIC LAND
language of the recreational use statute explicitly limited "landowner"
to non-governmental entities.12 7 Additionally, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court stated that the redundant immunity argument was "fa-
tally flawed for its failure to recognize the overarching principle of
legislation modifying the doctrine of sovereign immunity."128 There-
fore, granting the State and its political subdivisions ownership status
for the RLA is well received in several states, despite redundant im-
munity arguments. In light of such support, Bronsen's third point of
reasoning should at least be viewed skeptically.
Bronsen's next point of reasoning attempted to justify the Court's
exclusion of the derivative provisions in the TCA and PSTCA. The
Court attempted to do this by establishing that the Legislature in fact
contemplated immunizing recreational use public land when it
amended the enumerated sovereign immunity exceptions of the TCA
and PSTCA.129 Specifically, Bronsen pointed to section 13-910(3) of
the PSTCA, which maintains immunity for the political subdivisions
for negligent failure to inspect "property other than property owned by
or leased to such political subdivision."13o Thus, the Court believed
that the Legislature contemplated and rejected the idea of granting
the State and its political subdivisions immunity for negligent failure
to inspect their recreational use property.
Once again, it appears Bronsen may have assumed too much. The
enumeration in the PSTCA and TCA was adopted by Legislative Bill
262 in 1992.131 Bronsen assumed that this bill was adopted by a Leg-
islature which contemplated situations that would be covered by the
RLA and intentionally negated the government from qualifying for
such immunity. There is no indication in the legislative history that
anyone involved with the bill contemplated whether a governmental
entity which opens its land for recreational purposes should be im-
mune. 13 2 Rather, there is a clear indication that the only reason for
statute, interpreted in Brooks, is based off of the same Model Act as the RLA and
is similar in content).
127. Brooks, 489 S.E.2d at 651 n.8; see also Stone Mountain Mem'l Ass'n v. Her-
rington, 171 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Ga. 1969) (holding that governmental entities were
owners under a recreational use statute very similar to Nebraska's RLA because
there was no indication from the wording of the statute that the legislature only
meant for private individuals and entities to be included).
128. Hughey v. Grand River Dam Auth., 897 P.2d 1138, 1142 n.12 (Okla. 1995).
129. See Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 332-33, 722 N.W.2d 17, 27 (2006).
130. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219(7) (Cum. Supp. 2007) (utilizing the same lan-
guage but with reference to the State rather than political subdivisions).
131. 1991 Neb. Laws 101-108.
132. See Hearing on LB 262 Before the Judiciary Comm., 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 78-107
(Neb. 1991); Judiciary Comm. Executive Sess. Minutes, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1-2
(Neb. 1991); Judiciary Comm. Executive Sess. Minutes, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1 (Neb.
1991); Judiciary Comm. Statement Regarding LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1-2
(Neb. 1991); Summary Analysis of LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1-3 (Neb. 1991)
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this particular amendment, and the only contemplation by the Legis-
lature which adopted it, was far from any situation applicable to the
RLA. The State and political subdivisions had enacted laws and ordi-
nances which establish minimum standards for certain structures and
allowed the public entities to inspect and shut down non-compliant
structures. 133 However, governmental entities were concerned that
one of these inspections might be performed negligently and an in-
jured individual could sue the State or its political subdivisions based
upon such negligent inspection.1 34 The result of the bill was that the
owners of the facilities which were inspected maintained liability, but
the State no longer incurred liability for negligent inspection.
It appears that Bronsen interpreted the term "inspection" to in-
clude the general idea of landowners examining their land, thereby
knowing whether the land and facilities thereon were safe. The Legis-
lature does not appear to mean inspection of property in this sense.
Instead, it appears that the Legislature was contemplating the type of
inspection performed by specifically designated city or State inspec-
(compiled by the Judiciary Committee Staff for the Judiciary Committee Mem-
bers); Statement of Intent for LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1991) (Principal
Introducer: Sen. Douglas Kristensen); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d
Leg., 2d Sess. 8771 (Neb. 1992); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg.,
2d Sess. 8611, 8621, 8662 (Neb. 1992); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d
Leg., 2d Sess. 8498 (Neb. 1992); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg.,
2d Sess. 8262-63 (Neb. 1992); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 2d
Sess. 8043 (Neb. 1992); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 2d Sess.
7701-05 (Neb. 1992); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess.
6919-37 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess.
6153 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1972
(Neb. 1991); 5929 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st
Sess. 1722 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess.
1381 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1167
(Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 1151-66
(Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 943 (Neb.
1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 849-88 (Neb.
1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 804-42 (Neb.
1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 600, 632 (Neb.
1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 523 (Neb. 1991);
Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 478-88 (Neb. 1991);
Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 415-66 (Neb. 1991);
Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 390, 403-07 (Neb.
1991); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 313 (Neb. 1991);
Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 258 (Neb. 1991); Tran-
script of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 142 (Neb. 1991); Transcript
of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 120 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor
Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 51, 113 (Neb. 1991); Transcript of Floor
Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38 (Neb. 1991).
133. Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 6928-6930 (Neb. 1991)
(statement of Sen. Abboud); Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 262, 92d Leg., 2d
Sess. 7704-05 (Neb. 1992) (statement of Sen. Kristensen).
134. See supra note 133.
RECREATIONAL USES OF PUBLIC LAND
tors in order to ensure that private facilities meet minimum statutory
or regulatory standards. 135 The examples given by the Legislature in-
clude municipal inspectors examining elevators and electrical work in
private homes and businesses. 136 These examples and the discussion
in the legislative history do not appear to comport with Bronsen's un-
derstanding of "inspection," which included maintenance workers at a
county courthouse examining the lawn to see if it had holes.1
3 7 It is
entirely possible that compromises and drafting outside the purview
of documented legislative history took place. However, the legislative
history which exists portrays Legislative Bill 262 as a narrow reaction
to a specific problem, rather than a broad, sweeping amendment as
Bronsen assumed.
Furthermore, it is just as likely that the legislators adopting Legis-
lative Bill 262 knew the Watson rule, and thus felt that RLA-type situ-
ations involving the State and its political subdivisions were
adequately protected. In such case, there was no need to extend any
specific enumerated immunity for recreational-related injuries on
public land. Therefore, Bronsen was wrong in concluding that the
Legislature addressed the immunity of the State and its political sub-
divisions with regard to the RLA. First, the enumeration in question
was adopted without any apparent contemplation of RLA-type situa-
tions and with different intentions than Bronsen assumed. Second, it
can just as easily be assumed that the Legislature knew the Watson
rule and consequently felt that governmental entities were adequately
protected.
Bronsen next struggled to justify the two classes of liability which
are produced by the RLA. For example, the Court presented a hypo-
thetical of two individuals walking up the steps of the Nebraska State
Capitol. 138 One individual is a student on a field trip, while the other
is an individual coming to testify at a legislative hearing. 139 If a piece
of the Capitol breaks off and hits both of the individuals, they will be
treated differently under the Watson rule. 14o The individual testify-
ing is not at the Capitol for a recreational purpose and would be able
to sue the State under an ordinary negligence standard.' 4 ' On the
other hand, the student is attending for a recreational purpose and
would be forced to prove willful or malicious failure of the State under
the RLA.142
135. See supra note 133.
136. See supra note 133.
137. See Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006).
138. Id. at 331, 722 N.W.2d at 26.
139. Id. at 331, 722 N.W.2d at 26.
140. Id. at 331, 722 N.W.2d at 26.
141. Id. at 331, 722 N.W.2d at 26.
142. Id. at 331, 722 N.W.2d at 26.
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It is true that inequitable results may stem from the application of
the RLA, but the Court missed two key points. First, as FTD argued,
most cases involving the RLA do not rely on the subjective intent of
the injured. Rather, these cases generally rely on the activity itself. 143
The RLA specifically lists activities such as hunting, fishing, swim-
ming and boating, 14 4 and the relevant cases generally involve activi-
ties such as sliding on a slide,145 playing softball,146 and sledding. 14 7
These activities are all clearly recreational and the subjective intent of
the actor does not play a part. Therefore, subjective intent of the actor
should not be a factor in most cases.
Additionally, cases where subjective intent is important, such as
Bronsen's State Capitol hypothetical, seem to simply be a byproduct of
the RLA and will apply to private landowners as well as the State and
its political subdivisions. For instance, if the private owner of a his-
torical monument allows tours of the monument and a member of a
tour is injured by a defect in the property, the landowner enjoys RLA
immunity.148 However, if the same defect injures an individual who is
attending an open house of the property in order to determine whether
to purchase the monument, the landowner is under an ordinary negli-
gence standard.149 Hypothetical examples can be endlessly conjured,
establishing the dual categories of liability which the RLA pro-
duces.150 However, this dichotomy exists for private landowners as
143. Brief on Hearing for Further Review for Fur Trade Days, Inc. as Respondant-
Appellee at 12-13, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17
(2006) (No. S-04-000237).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-729 (Reissue 2004).
145. Thies v. City of Omaha, 225 Neb. 817, 408 N.W.2d 306 (1987); Watson v. City of
Omaha, 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
146. Bailey v. City of North Platte, 218 Neb. 810, 359 N.W.2d 766 (1984).
147. Gallagher v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 225 Neb. 354, 405 N.W.2d 571 (1987).
148. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-729 (Reissue 2004) (listing "visiting, viewing, or en-
joying historical . .. sites" as a recreational purpose).
149. Regardless of whether the individual was an invitee or licensee, the landowner
owes a duty of reasonable care. See Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552
N.W.2d 51 (1996).
150. This is especially the case due to the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding in
Holden v. Schwer, 242 Neb. 389, 495 N.W.2d 269 (1993) that the RLA can take
effect in situations where the land is only open to some of the public, some of the
time, rather than the entire public, all the time. Therefore, many other situa-
tions can be thought of which demonstrate that this basic liability dichotomy ex-
ists for private landowners. For example, a farmer might allow neighbors to use
all-terrain vehicles on his or her land for recreational purposes. The same farmer
might later request the help of a neighbor with some matter, requiring such
neighbor to traverse the farmer's land on an all-terrain vehicle. Claims for inju-
ries incurred by the neighbor coming to help the farmer with a task would not be
barred by the RLA, yet claims for injuries incurred by the neighbor while using
the land for recreational purposes would be barred.
RECREATIONAL USES OF PUBLIC LAND
well as the State and its subdivisions. 15 1 Therefore, such an inequita-
ble result should not have been used to militate the Court's ruling
against including governmental entities in the RLA. If the Legisla-
ture intended to create such a result for private landowners, it should
not be too difficult to believe they intended the result for governmen-
tal landowners as well. 152
Finally, Bronsen reasoned that because the RLA was based off of
the Model Act, the intentions of the Model Act should control the in-
tentions of the RLA.153 The Model Act contains a preamble which
specifically states that the Act is "designed to encourage availability of
private lands."15 4 In support of this argument, the court cited deci-
sions from four states which interpreted recreational use statutes not
to include governmental entities as owners, at least partially because
of reliance upon the preamble of the Model Act.
155
Two main issues arise with Bronsen's reasoning on this point.
First, several state recreational use statutes have been interpreted to
exclude governmental entities.156 However, several other state recre-
ational use statutes, which are also based on the Model Act, have been
judicially interpreted to include governmental entities. 157  Conse-
quently, Bronsen cannot establish that a majority of courts fall in line
151. In situations where land is continuously held open for both non-recreational as
well as temporary recreational purposes, subjective intent is most pronounced
and thus the dichotomy presents itself most fully. Such a situation certainly oc-
curs in the public sector on a much more frequent basis than for private landown-
ers. Therefore, it is more difficult to justify allowing the state to be an owner at
all under the RLA when viewed from this narrow situation. However, it is impor-
tant to note once again that this situation has not occurred with any frequency in
the time since Watson. Furthermore, this situation-public lands continuously
held open for recreational and non-recreational purposes-is at least partially
remedied by Veskerna v. City of West Point, 254 Neb. 540, 578 N.W.2d 25 (1998),
overruled by Bronsen v. Dawes County 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006). In
Verskerna, the Court held that public land which was always held open to the
public (a public street), could not be temporarily immunized under the RLA when
a recreational activity (a car show) was occurring on the land. 254 Neb. at 543,
578 N.W.2d at 27. Therefore, instead of overruling Watson, the Court in Bronsen
could have come to the same result by extending Veskerna to this situation where
someone was injured at a temporary recreational activity taking place on the
courthouse lawn which is continuously held open for non-recreational use.
152. In furtherance of this proposition, almost half of the states have created this di-
chotomous result by explicitly stating in their recreational use statutes that the
State and its subdivisions qualify for the immunity under the act.
153. 272 Neb. 320, 334, 722 N.W.2d 17, 28 (2006).
154. 24 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Suggested State Legislation 150 (1965).
155. Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242 (Conn. 1996); Monteville v. Terrebonne
Parish Consol. Gov't, 567 So. 2d 1097 (La. 1990); Hovland v. City of Grand Forks,
563 N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 1997); Stamper v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 445
S.E.2d 238 (W.Va. 1994).
156. See supra note 155.
157. See, e.g., Trimblett v. State, 383 A.2d 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Pip-
pin v. M.A. Hauser Enters., Inc., 676 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Hughey v.
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with its reasoning. Furthermore, none of the states which interpret
their recreational use statutes to include governmental entities have
been amended to exclude such entities. 158 On the other hand, states
with judicial rulings excluding governmental entities from recrea-
tional use statutes have seen legislative amendments specifically in-
cluding the State and its political subdivisions.159
The second main issue Bronsen overlooked on this point of reason-
ing was that the preamble of the Model Act was not adopted with the
RLA. The purpose of adopting the statute is expounded in section 37-
730, as an encouragement to "owners of land to make available to the
public land and water areas for recreational purposes." This purpose
does not limit the RLA to private landowners in any way. The Legis-
lature may have intentionally left out the preamble in order to open
the RLA to all landowners, public or private. Assuming that the Leg-
islature intentionally left out the preamble is just as easy as assuming
that it intended to implicitly incorporate the preamble. Thus, Bron-
sen's conclusion that the preamble to the Model Act should bind the
application of the RLA is suspect16o
Therefore, unlike Bronsen's overall conclusion, it is certainly not
clear that the Legislature intended to exclude governmental entities
from the RLA. Even if the Legislature did not intend to affirmatively
include such entities, the State and its political subdivisions should
qualify under the TCA and PSTCA derivative immunity provisions.
Furthermore, because the actual intent of the Legislature in adopting
the RLA is questionable, Bronsen should have granted more weight to
two additional arguments made by Dawes County and FTD.
First, Bronsen noted (as FTD argued) that "ordinarily, where a
statute has been judicially construed and that construction has not
evoked an amendment from the Legislature, it will be presumed that
the Legislature has acquiesced in the court's determination of its in-
tent."161 The Court then proceeded to summarily dismiss such an ar-
gument, essentially reasoning that acquiescence by the Legislature in
Grand River Dam Auth., 897 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 1995); Lory v. City of Philadelphia,
674 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996).
158. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to 51-3-26 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to
58-3207 (2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.73301 (West 2008); N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2 to 2A:42A-10 (West
2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18-1533.181 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 76, § 10.1 (West 2008); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 477-1 to 477-8 (West
2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to 27-3-70 (2007).
159. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2791, 9:2795 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to
53-08-06 (2005); Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation Dist., 642 N.W.2d 864
(N.D. 2002).
160. See also Klepper v. City of Milford, 825 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1987) (making this
same point in reasoning that governmental entities are included in Kansas' recre-
ational use statute).
161. 272 Neb. 320, 335, 722 N.W.2d 17, 28 (2006).
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favor of a prior ruling should not absolutely preclude a subsequent
court from determining the prior interpretation invalid.16 2 Thus, the
Court apparently gave no weight to this argument. Bronsen was
likely correct in not viewing legislative acquiescence as an absolute, or
even determinative factor when deciding whether to overturn a prior
interpretation of a statute. However, because the correct interpreta-
tion of the RLA is highly questionable, 16 3 and legislative acquiescence
is a valid tool of statutory construction, 164 Bronsen should have given
such acquiescence more weight than it did. Therefore, the legislative
acquiescence following Watson adds one more valid argument to the
side of the scale weighing in favor of interpreting the RLA to include
governmental entities.
Second, Bronsen dismissed FTD's argument that stare decisis
should be given great weight in this case.
16 5
The doctrine of stare decisis is grounded on public policy and, as such, is enti-
tled to great weight and must be adhered to unless the reasons therefor have
ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous, or are manifestly wrong and mischie-
vous or unless more harm than good will result from doing so.
16 6
Bronsen concluded that Watson was manifestly wrong, and accord-
ingly, stare decisis should not perpetuate an erroneous decision.1
67
As previously noted, there are numerous valid concerns as to
whether Watson in fact was incorrectly decided. 168 Therefore, the
Court's nominal discussion of stare decisis and quick conclusion that
Watson was manifestly wrong is disconcerting.169 Additionally, not
only was it unclear whether "more harm than good [would] result"
from maintaining the Watson rule, but it was arguable that "more
harm than good would result" from overruling the decision.170 By
overruling Watson, Bronsen caused the State and its political subdivi-
sions to stop supplying many new facilities and lands for recreational
use, and close numerous existing facilities. 17 1 Clearly, Bronsen had a
widespread and far-reaching negative effect on large segments of the
162. Id. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 28.
163. See discussion supra section IV.A.
164. See, e.g., State v. Neiss, 260 Neb. 691, 619 N.W.2d 222 (2000) (utilizing the princi-
ple of legislative acquiescence in maintaining a prior interpretation of a statute
dealing with double jeopardy which had not evoked legislative reaction).
165. 272 Neb. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 29.
166. Id. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 29.
167. Id. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 29.
168. See discussion supra section IV.A.
169. The Nebraska Supreme Court has, on many occasions, emphasized the impor-
tance of stare decisis. See, e.g., State v. Burlison 255 Neb. 190, 196, 583 N.W.2d
31, 36 (1998) (emphasizing that stare decisis is "the bedrock of our common-law
jurisprudence," and should only be discounted if the earlier precedent was
"clearly incorrect"); Holm v. Holm, 267 Neb. 867, 678 N.W.2d 499 (2004) (same
language).
170. Bronsen, 272 Neb. at 335, 722 N.W.2d at 29.
171. See, e.g., supra notes 12, 14, & 78.
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population. Such a foreseeable result should have caused the Court to
take stare decisis into consideration with substantial weight. Bronsen
appears to have completely dismissed stare decisis and thereby dis-
missed a valid public policy consideration of great weight supporting
the inclusion of governmental entities in the RLA.
B. Compromise by the Legislature
In response to reactions across the State, the Nebraska Legislature
adopted Legislative Bill 564, granting certain immunities to the State
and its subdivisions with regard to public recreational land.17
2 Al-
though many individuals viewed the legislative overruling of Bronsen
as a necessary event to protect important recreational lands and facili-
ties, competing interests believed that simply adding the State and its
political subdivisions to the definition of "owner" in the RLA would
have disadvantages. A series of compromises between these two sides
amended the TCA and PSTCA to grant limited immunities in three
distinct situations to the State and its subdivisions, rather than grant-
ing the wider immunity enjoyed under the RLA.173 Overall, the com-
promises which led to the adopted version of Legislative Bill 564 did
not give either side everything it wanted, but rather created a bill
which was sufficiently balanced, and supportive of good public policy.
One policy objection to simply redefining "owner" in the RLA was
that the RLA is too high of a standard of liability to require injured
parties to establish. The willful or malicious standard necessary to
impose liability under the RLA requires a conscious knowledge of the
danger coupled with either intentional or reckless failure to prevent
the harm. 174 Furthermore, under the TCA and PSTCA, intentional
torts are barred.1 75 Consequently, some interests believed that the
area between intentional torts, and willful or malicious failure, was
too small to adequately protect parties injured on public land, and en-
courage governmental entities to maintain safe facilities.176 The
adopted version of Legislative Bill 564 chose to adopt a gross negli-
gence standard with regard to its broadest category of injuries, those
172. For a full discussion of the current legal landscape with regard to Legislative Bill
564, see supra section III.B.
173. Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 68 (Neb. 2007) (state-
ment of Sen. Lathrop) (stating that this bill, as it was later adopted, was a com-
promise between the competing interests to the legislation).
174. See, e.g., Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 326-27, 722 N.W.2d 17, 23
(2006).
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-910(7) (Supp. 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219(4) (Supp.
2007).
176. See, e.g., Change the Recreational Liability Act: Hearing on LB 564 Before the
Judiciary Comm., 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 82-86 (Neb. 2007) (statement of Maren
Chaloupka, Bronsen's attorney).
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arising from localized defects. 177 If the State or political subdivision is
found to be grossly negligent in their duty to locate and correct de-
fects, then such entity is liable. Therefore, Legislative Bill 564 chose
to broaden the area between recreational use immunity and inten-
tional tort immunity, allowing injured individuals a greater ability to
sue and further encouraging safe maintenance of public lands.
Opponents of Legislative Bill 564 also voiced concerns that users of
the government-owned recreational land would not know of the in-
creased standard of liability they would need to establish if they were
injured.17 8 Proposals were made supporting a requirement upon the
State and its political subdivisions to display a sign informing users of
the land the protections which Legislative Bill 564 offered to govern-
mental owners. 1 79 These proposals were only accepted after a com-
promise specified that an absence of the sign would not lead to the
governmental owners of the recreational land losing the protections
Legislative Bill 564 grants. 1so This compromise played a major role in
the acquiescence of Legislative Bill 564's opponents.'
8 '
As a further consolation to concerned parties, the proponents of the
bill defined the limits of the governmental recreational use immunity
as three distinct areas in the amended Legislative Bill 564, rather
than a broad, relatively undefined, scope of immunity which govern-
mental entities would enjoy under the RLA. Under the RLA, an
owner is protected from any injury occurring during recreational use
of the land, unless willful or malicious failure to prevent the injury
exists.18 2 On the other hand, Legislative Bill 564 only grants immu-
nity in three distinct situations: 1) injuries resulting from the inherent
risk of the recreational activity; 2) injuries arising out of a spot or lo-
calized defect, with the governmental entity under a gross negligence
standard to locate and correct such defects; and 3) injuries arising out
of the design of a skate park or bicycle motocross park, if such park is
177. LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007).
178. See, e.g., Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 22-83 (Neb.
2007) (detailing extensive debate regarding whether or not to require a warning
sign at recreational facilities owned by the State and its political subdivisions in
order to inform users of their legal relationship under the new legislation).
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Transcript of Floor Debate on LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 73 (Neb.
2007) (statement of Sen. Lathrop) (explaining the compromise regarding the post-
ing of signs and their impact upon liability to the State and its political
subdivisions).
181. The main opponent to the bill, Senator Ernie Chambers, relented his filibuster of
the legislation upon completion of this compromise. Sen. Chambers stated that
"[t]he signage requirement is a small price to pay for what [the proponents of
Legislative Bill 5641 are getting in return." Anna Jo Bratton, Deal with Chambers
lets bill to shield cities advance, LINCOLN J. STAR available at http://journalstar.
com/articles/2007/05/02/news/politics/doc4638fi452bd68574903110.txt.
182. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-731 to 37-734 (Reissue 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
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not designed and constructed in accordance with generally recognized
engineering or safety standards.1S3 These three provisions include
virtually all of the potential situations where the State and its politi-
cal subdivisions would have protection under the RLA. However, by
defining the situations in greater detail than found in the RLA, Legis-
lative Bill 564 should give clearer guidance to courts and help contain
possible extensions of immunity which may occur under the relatively
undefined language of the RLA.
Therefore, Legislative Bill 564 appears to be a good compromise for
all interested parties. On one hand, the bill grants a more limited and
well defined scope of immunity to the State and its political subdivi-
sions, thereby extending greater relief to injured parties, as well as
encouraging a high level of maintenance for public recreational land.
At the same time, Legislative Bill 564 gives back to the State and its
political subdivisions the pre-Bronsen protections necessary to main-
tain and increase numerous recreational lands and facilities. Overall,
Legislative Bill 564 should be viewed as a solid compromise which
supports good public policy and puts the state of the law in a well
justified position.
V. CONCLUSION
After twenty-five years of judicial precedent, Bronsen stripped the
State and its political subdivisions of immunity for injuries occurring
on recreational lands, thereby unleashing a firestorm of debate and
legislative reaction. However, the reasoning which Bronsen relied on
is not immune to dissent. While Bronsen made valid points, numer-
ous counterarguments are just as, if not more, persuasive. At the very
least, Bronsen's lack of discussion regarding these counterarguments
is unsettling.
However, after Bronsen the Nebraska Legislature acted in re-
sponse to an outpouring of concerns from municipalities and other
governmental entities. Legislative Bill 564 is a compromise which is
more limited and specific than the immunity found under the RLA,
but grants enough protection to governmental entities that recrea-
tional lands and facilities should remain available. As a consequence
to enacting Legislative Bill 564, the Legislature effectively closed the
door on any overruling of Bronsen. Although the immunity granted in
Legislative Bill 564 is distinct from that found in the RLA, Legislative
Bill 564 is most likely the on-point legislative intent which Bronsen
believed section 13-910(3) to be.184 Therefore, because Legislative Bill
564 directly addresses the immunity of the State and its political sub-
divisions within the TCA and PSTCA, the Court will most likely no
183. LB 564, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2007).
184. See 272 Neb. 320, 333, 722 N.W.2d 17, 27 (2006).
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longer entertain arguments that governmental entities should be in-
cluded in the RLA. Luckily, by enacting Legislative Bill 564 the Legis-
lature reached a good compromise between interested parties, and
made the state of this area of the law healthy and justifiable.
